

(USITC), on the basis of its investigation (No. TA-406-13), that market disruption exists with respect to imports from China of honey provided for in heading 0409 and sub-headings 1702.90 and 2106.90 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

After considering all relevant aspects of the investigation, including those set forth in section 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, I have determined that import relief for honey is not in the national economic interest of the United States. However, I am directing the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with the appropriate agencies, to develop a plan to monitor imports of honey from China. The monitoring program is to be developed within thirty days of this determination.

In determining not to provide relief, I considered its overall costs to the U.S. economy. The USITC majority recommendation for a quarterly tariff rate quota (a 25 percent ad valorem charge on the first 12.5 million pounds each quarter, increasing to 50 percent on amounts above that level), to be applied for three years, would cost consumers about \$7 million while increasing producers' income by just \$1.9 million. Overall, national income would be reduced by approximately \$1.2 million. The other forms of relief recommended by other Commissioners would also result in substantial costs to consumers while offering little benefit to producers and reducing national income.

In addition, the gap between production and consumption in the United States is approximately 100 million pounds, with imports of honey from China helping to fill that gap at the low end for industrial use. Any restrictions on imports of honey from China would likely lead to increased imports from other countries rather than significantly increased market share for U.S. producers.

Although rising somewhat since 1991, U.S. honey inventories are not large by historical experience, either in absolute amounts or relative to consumption. Honey stocks reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture were much higher in the mid-1980's (about 75 percent of consumption in 1985 and 1986), before falling to their lowest level in a decade in 1991 (26.6 percent of consumption). 1993

stocks were 37.8 percent of consumption, well below the 1980-1993 average level of 46.4 percent.

The U.S. government has supported honey producers since 1950, in part, to ensure enough honeybees would be available for crop pollination. This is an important national interest. I believe that current trends in the provision of pollination and honey production will not be significantly affected by not providing relief. Crop producers indicate that they believe pollination will still be cost effective even if service prices rise.

I have also concluded that, in this case, imposing trade restrictions on imports of honey would run counter to our policy of promoting an open and fair international trading system.

This determination is to be published in the *Federal Register*.

William J. Clinton

Message to Congress Reporting on Trade With China

April 21, 1994

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to section 406 of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2436) and sections 202 and 203 of the Trade Act of 1974 (as those sections were in effect on the day before the date of the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988), I have determined the action I will take with respect to the affirmative determination of the United States International Trade Commission (USITC), on the basis of its investigation (No. TA-406-13), that market disruption exists with respect to imports from China of honey provided for in heading 0409 and sub-headings 1702.90 and 2106.90 of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States.

After considering all relevant aspects of the investigation, including those set forth in section 202(c) of the Trade Act of 1974, I have determined that import relief for honey is not in the national economic interest of the United States. However, I am directing the United States Trade Representative (USTR), in consultation with the appropriate agencies to develop a plan to monitor imports

of honey from China. The monitoring program is to be developed within thirty days of this determination.

Since I have determined that the provision of import relief is not in the national economic interest of the United States, I am required by that section 203(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 to report to Congress on the reasons underlying this determination.

In determining not to provide import relief, I considered its overall costs to the U.S. economy. The USITC majority recommendation for a quarterly tariff rate quota (a 25 percent ad valorem charge on the first 12.5 million pounds each quarter, increasing to 50 percent on amounts above that level), to be applied for three years, would cost consumers about \$7 million while increasing producers' income by just \$1.9 million. The other forms of relief recommended by other Commissioners would also result in substantial costs to consumers while offering little benefit to producers.

In addition, the gap between production and consumption in the United States is approximately 100 million pounds, with imports of honey from China helping to fill that gap at the low end for industrial use. Any restrictions on imports of honey from China would likely lead to increased imports from other countries rather than significantly increased market share for U.S. producers.

Although rising somewhat since 1991, U.S. honey inventories are not large by historical experience, either in absolute amounts or relative to consumption. Honey stocks reported by the U.S. Department of Agriculture were much higher in the mid-1980's (about 75 percent of consumption in 1985 and 1986), before falling to their lowest level in a decade in 1991 (26.6 percent of consumption). The 1993 stocks were 37.8 percent of consumption, well below the 1980-1993 average level of 46.4 percent.

The U.S. government has supported honey producers since 1950, in part, to ensure enough honeybees would be available for crop pollination. This is an important national interest. I believe that current trends in the provision of pollination and honey production will not be significantly affected by not providing relief. Crop producers indicate

that they believe pollination will still be cost effective even if service prices rise.

I have also concluded that, in this case, imposing trade restrictions on imports of honey would run counter to our policy of promoting an open and fair international trading system.

William J. Clinton

The White House,
April 21, 1994.

NOTE: An original was not available for verification of the content of this message.

Interview With Journalists on South Africa

April 20, 1994

Q. Could I begin, Mr. President, with a two-part question? What is the significance of the South African election to you and the American people? And do you have any particular message for the people of South Africa that we could take back to them?

The President. First of all, I think it would be difficult to overstate the significance of this election to the American people for many reasons, first of all, our own history of racial division. We, after all, fought a great Civil War over slavery, and we continue to deal with our own racial challenges today. So all Americans, I think, have always been more drawn to the problems and the promise of South Africa than perhaps other nations have been.

Secondly, our own civil rights movement has, for decades, had a relationship with the antiapartheid movement in South Africa. So this will be a great sense of personal joy to many, many Americans who have been involved in this whole issue personally.

And finally, it's important to the United States because of the promise of harmony and prosperity in South Africa and what that might mean, not only to South Africa but to many other nations in the region and to the prospect of a revitalization, a new energy, a new peace, a new sense of possibility throughout at least the southern part of Africa. So it's very important.

Q. Any particular message?